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THE 2019 WILLIAM MARSHALL BULLITT LECTURE
INSIDER TRADING - SEC V. MARK CUBAN LITIGATION SAGA

A

Marc I. Steinberg*

I. SETTING THE STAGE
The Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) enforcement action
against Mark Cuban for allegedly engaging in illegal insider trading was far
from standard fare. Unlike the vast majority of SEC enforcement actions that
are settled pursuant to the consent negotiation process, whereby the
defendant neither admits nor denies the Commission's allegations of
misconduct,' Mr. Cuban declined overtures of settlement and proceeded to
trial. After years of contentious litigation, where he incurred legal fees of $12
million, 2 Mr. Cuban emerged victorious with a favorable jury verdict.3 The
Commission's case against Mr. Cuban raises questions regarding the scope
of our insider trading laws, the strategic decisions made, the high costs of
defending one's good name, and the appropriate limits of governmental
prosecutorial discretion.

Rupert and Lillian Radford Professor of Law, SMU Dedman School of Law. Director, SMU
Corporate Externship Program. This article is derived from my presentation of the William Marshall
Bullitt Lecture delivered on February 28, 2019. 1 thank Dean Colin Crawford, Professor
Manning Warren,
the faculty and students of the Louis D. Brandeis School of Law, and the Louisville legal community for
hosting my visit and helping to make my experience so very enjoyable.
See MARC I. STEINBERG & RALPH C. FERRARA, SECURITIES PRACTICE: FEDERAL AND STATE
ENFORCEMENT § 3:60 (2d ed. 2001 & Supp. 2018-2019) (stating that as high as ninety percent of SEC
enforcement actions are settled); William R. McLucas, Scott M. Litvinoff, & William
F. Osberghaus, Jr.,
"Neither Admit Nor Deny" Settlements from the Stanley Sporkin Era: Wise Policy or Outdated
Enforcement Notion?, 43 SEC. REG. L. J. 29 (2015) ("Over the last 40 years, the Commission's standard
approach has been to permit defendants to enter into a settlement without admitting or denying the
allegations against them (i.e., on a 'neither admit nor deny' basis)."). See generally Frank Razzano, To
Cooperatewith the Securities and Exchange Commission or Not to Cooperate - That Is the Question, 31
SEC. REG. L. J. 410 (2003).
2 See Dana ElBoghdady, Billionaire Mark Cuban Takes on the SEC, WASH. POST (Nov.
20, 2013),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/billionaire-mark-cuban-takes-on-the-

sec/2013/11/20/2b67134a-4a7c-1 e3-be6b-d3d28122e6d4 story.html?utm_term=.257a8bb1 64ff
(reporting Mr. Cuban's assertion that he "paid $12 million in legal fees to defend himself").
3 Id. See also Renae Merle, Cuban on His Crusadeagainst the SEC- And When He'll Be Satisfied,
WASH. POST (Mar. 17, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/cuban-on-his-

crusade-against-the-sec--and-when-hell-be-satisfied/20l6/03/17/619d9e9a-ebae-1
07 3 d593Oa7b7_story.html?utm_term=.2fe6d94ee659.
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In my recent book, Securities andExchange Commission v. Cuban -A
4
Trial of Insider Trading, the many complexities of this litigation saga are
addressed. As an experiential resource, the book contains excerpts of key
documents comprising this litigation from the SEC investigative stage
through the jury verdict and entering of judgment. Refreshingly, these
documents-including pleadings, motions, witness testimony, oral
arguments, and jury instructions-are instructive and interesting. This
portrayal emanates from the contentious nature of the litigation and the
identity of the named defendant Mark Cuban, a well-known entrepreneur and
investor whose interests include ownership of the National Basketball
5
Association's (NBA) Dallas Mavericks and being one of the principal
6
investors on the reality television program "Shark Tank."
Being retained as an expert witness on Mr. Cuban's behalf in this
litigation, I saw this litigation unfold from the "playing field" rather than as
a spectator.7 I had the opportunity to work with Mr. Cuban's legal defense
8
team comprised of preeminent securities litigators. As a former SEC
9
attorney, including in the Division of Enforcement, I continue to have high
respect for the integrity and dedication of the Commission. Nonetheless, in
this litigation, questionable decisions were made by the SEC that
significantly contributed to its defeat. 10 In addition, the Commission's broad
use of the misappropriation theory," while receiving evident approbation
2
from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,' generates concern
about whether this construction is consistent with U.S. Supreme Court
precedent. 3 The next Section will explore the government's invocation of
the misappropriation theory in the context of this litigation and the broader
public policy issues raised.

. 4 MARC I. STEINBERG, THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION V. CUBAN INSIDER TRADING (2019).

' Id. at
6 Id.

A TRIAL OF

1.

Id. at 74-75 (discussing my expert witness report in this litigation).
One of Mr. Cuban's attorneys, Mr. George Anhang, authored the Foreword for STEINBERG, supra
note 4; see id. at xv-xix.
9 I worked at the SEC for four years, including in the Division of Enforcement. During that time
period, the Honorable Stanley Sporkin, retired U.S. federal district judge, was the Enforcement Director.
Judge Sporkin, to whom the book is dedicated, is my mentor and has enjoyed a superlative career.
15 See discussion infra notes 64-97 and accompanying text.
" The govermnent alleged that the entering into of an oral confidentiality agreement was sufficient
to subject Mr. Cuban to liability under the misappropriation theory. See discussion infra notes 42-51 and
'

8

accompanying text.
12 SEC v. Cuban, 620 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 2010). See discussion infra notes 46-51 and accompanying
text.
13 See discussion infra notes 14-63 and accompanying text.
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II. A "MAGICAL" TRANSITION-A "NON-DISCLOSURE AGREEMENT"
CREATING A RELATIONSHIP OF TRUST AND CONFIDENCE

In United States v. O'Hagan,"4 the U.S. Supreme Court adopted the
misappropriation theory under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act' 5
to hold subject persons liable for trading based on material and non-public
information.1 6 Under the misappropriation theory, liability is premised upon
such person's breach of fiduciary duty or a relationship of trust and
confidence to the source of the information." Deception by means of
nondisclosure is a central tenet of the misappropriation theory, thereby
focusing on the violator feigning fidelity to the information source.1 8 Because
of this underlying rationale, the O'Hagan Court recognized that full
disclosure to the source of the information precludes liability under this
theory.' 9 Hence, if the subject person reveals to the information source that
she plans to trade, no deception has been perpetrated within the confines of
Section 10(b).20 In such event, depending on the context, liability may be
levied upon the misappropriator on other grounds, such as for breach of
contract, violation of the duty of loyalty, or pursuant to the federal wire fraud
statute. 21
A fundamental principle of the misappropriation theory is that the
violator owes a fiduciary duty or a relationship of trust and confidence to the
source of the information.22 In situations involving an employee-employer or
23
attorney-client relationship, this showing is met without difficulty.

521 U.S. 642 (1997).
1s 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012).
16 O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 651-66.
14

"7 Id. at 652 ("The 'misappropriation theory' holds that a person commits fraud 'in connection
with'
a securities transaction, and thereby violates Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, when he misappropriates
confidential information for securities trading purposes, in breach of a duty owed to the source of the
information.").
I
Id. ("[T]he misappropriation theory premises liability on a fiduciary-turned-trader's deception of
those who entrusted him with access to confidential information.").
19 Id. at 655 ("Because the deception essential to the misappropriation theory involves feigning

fidelity to the source of the information, if the fiduciary discloses to the source that he plans to trade on
the nonpublic information, there is no 'deceptive device' and thus no Section 10(b) violation - although
the fiduciary-turned-trader may remain liable under state law for breach of the duty of loyalty.").
20 Id.
21 Id.; see also Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987) (affirming defendant's conviction
pursuant to mail fraud statute); MARC I. STEINBERG & WILLIAM K.S. WANG, INSIDER TRADING § 5.4 (3d

ed. 2010).
22 O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652.
23

These principal-agent

relationships are fiduciary in nature. See, e.g., Upjohn
Co. v. United States,
449 U.S. 383 (1981); Gelfand v. Horizon Corp., 675 F.2d 1108 (10th Cir. 1982) (interpreting New Mexico
law). See generally Marc I. Steinberg & Logan J. Weissler, The Litigation Privilege as a Shelter for
MiscreantLegal Counsel, 97 OR. L. REV. 1 (2018).
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Enforcement dilemmas arise where the information source conveys the
material non-public information to an individual with whom she has no such
relationship.2 4 Well aware of this shortcoming, the SEC promulgated Rule
10b5-2,2 5 which sets forth three distinct circumstances that implicate a
26
For our purposes here-SEC v.
relationship of trust and confidence.
confidence arises under this rule
and
trust
of
relationship
a
Cuban--such
confidentiality of the subject
the
maintain
to
when the recipient agrees
information.2 7
This provision was utilized by the SEC in its enforcement action against
Mr. Cuban, who owned six percent of the common stock of a Nasdaq
28
publicly-traded company, Mamma.com, based in Montreal. Although being
the company's largest shareholder, as recognized by the Commission, Mr.
Cuban neither was a director nor officer of the company, nor was he
otherwise an insider due to his relationship with the company's
3
30
management. 29 He therefore was not a "classical" or "temporary insider" 1

"

See United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 567-68 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that "a fiduciary

and that
duty cannot be imposed unilaterally by entrusting a person with confidential information"
"marriage does not, without more, create a fiduciary relationship").

Trading, Securities Act
2s 17 C.F.R. § 240.1 0b5-2 (2019). See also Selective Disclosure and Insider
Release No. 7881, Exchange Act Release No. 43154, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716 (Aug. 15, 2000) (adopting 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2).

26 Under Rule 10b5-2, a duty of trust or confidence exists under Section 10(b) for purposes of the
misappropriation theory in the following situations:
(1) when such recipient agreed to maintain the confidentiality of the information; (2) when a
reasonable expectation of confidentiality existed due to that the persons who had the
communication(s) (including the misappropriator) enjoyed a history, practice, or pattern of
sharing confidences; and (3) when the source of the information (i.e., the person providing
such information) was a spouse, child, parent, or sibling of the person receiving the
information, unless it can be established as an affirmative defense that on the facts and
circumstances of the particular family relationship that no reasonable expectation of
confidentiality existed.
MARC I. STEINBERG, UNDERSTANDING SECURITIES LAW 389 (7th ed. 2018).
27 See § 240.10b5-2(b)(1) (stating that "[flor purposes of this section, a 'duty of trust or confidence'
exists in the following circumstances, among others: (1) Whenever a person agrees to maintain

information in confidence").
2009) (No. 3:08-Cv-205028 See Complaint para. 10, SEC v. Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d 713 (N.D. Tex.

reprinted in
D) [hereinafter SEC Complaint] (setting forth that Cuban had a 6.3% stake in the company),
STEINBERG, supra note 4, at 35.
29 See SEC Complaint, supra note 28, paras. 10-27.

3

See generally SEC v. Cuban, 620 F.3d 551, 553 (5th Cir. 2010) ("The classical theory of insider

his
trading prohibits a 'corporate insider' from trading on material nonpublic information obtained from
position within the corporation without disclosing the information").
Supreme Court in Dirks v.
3' The "temporary" or "quasi" insider rationale was adopted by the U.S.

SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983). There, the Court stated:
Under certain circumstances, such as where corporate information is revealed legitimately to
an underwriter, accountant, lawyer, or consultant working for the corporation, those outsiders

become fiduciaries of the shareholders. The basis for recognizing this fiduciary duty is not
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owing a fiduciary duty to the subject corporation and its shareholders under
U.S. Supreme Court precedent.32
As alleged by the Commission, Mr. Cuban entered into an oral
confidentiality agreement with the Chief Executive Officer of Mamma.com,
Mr. Guy Faurd, who inquired whether Mr. Cuban was interested in
subscribing to a forthcoming Mamma.com stock offering.3 3 Pursuant to this
alleged confidentiality agreement, Mr. Cuban agreed to refrain from selling
his Mamma.com stock until after the company publicly disclosed the
offering. 34 The offering, known as a PIPE offering,35 was viewed by Mr.
Cuban as dilutive to current Mamma.com shareholders and thereby
antithetical to their financial interests. 36 After a brief phone conversation with
Mr. Faur6, 37 followed by Mr. Cuban calling the company's placement agent
situated in San Francisco (Merriman Curhan & Ford), a discussion lasting
eight minutes,38 Mr. Cuban sold his Mamma.com stock prior to the
company's public announcement of the PIPE offering. 39
Insofar as whether improper tipping transpired, by communicating this
information with the motivation to benefit the company, neither Mr. Faurd
nor the placement agent did so for personal financial benefit or to provide a
gift to Mr. Cuban.40 Accordingly, as the SEC acknowledged, these
communications were not within the tipper-tippee proscription of insider
trading law.4 ' Nonetheless, because Mr. Cuban allegedly entered into a non-

simply that such persons acquired nonpublic corporate information, but rather that they have
entered into a special confidential relationship in the conduct of the business of the enterprise
and are given access to information solely for corporate purposes. . . . For such a duty to be
imposed, however, the corporation must expect the outsider to keep the disclosed nonpublic
information confidential, and the relationship at least must imply such a duty.

Id at 655 n.14.
32 See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
3

See SEC Complaint, supra note 28, paras. 12-16.

34

See id paras. 10-27.

A PIPE offering refers to a private investment in public equity. Succinctly stated,
"PIPEs are
privately issued equity or equity-linked securities that are normally sold to 'accredited investors' [those
investors meeting certain minimum financial thresholds] by public companies in a hybrid transaction
typically involving a [SEC] Regulation D private placement followed by a registered public offering."
Marc I. Steinberg & Emmanuel U. Obi, Examining the Pipeline: A ContemporaryAssessment of Private
"

Investments in Public Equity ("PIPEs"), 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1, 3-5 (2008).

36 See STEINBERG, supra note 4, at 3 (quoting Mark Cuban as asserting "I
hate when companies do
PIPES-type transactions to raise money [as they are] dilutive .... ").
37 See STEINBERG, supra note 4, at 175-76 (restating trial testimony of Guy Faurd, Chief Executive
Officer of Mamma.com).
3 See id at 153-157 (restating trial testimony of Arnold Owen of Merriman Curhan Ford).
39 See SEC Complaint, supra note 28, paras. 18-26.

40 See id paras. 12-20.
41 See STEINBERG, supra note 4, at 47-48 (restating SEC Memorandum of Law Opposing Cuban's
Motion to Dismiss). As a Canadian issuer, Mamma.com was not subject to SEC Regulation FD. See 17

C.F.R. §§ 243'.100-243.101 (2019). See generally Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange

6
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42
disclosure agreement (NDA) with the company, the Commission asserted
that he misappropriated the information when he sold his Mamma.com stock
prior to the company's public disclosure of the PIPE offering and, hence,
43
engaged in fraudulent insider trading. In his defense, among numerous
other assertions, Mr. Cuban denied that he ever entered into a confidentiality
agreement or NDA with Mamma.com or any agent of the company.' After
45
the district court's dismissal of the complaint, the Fifth Circuit reversed
reasoning that sufficient allegations were set forth for the case to go forward
to the discovery phase.4 6

Act Release No. 43154, 73 SEC Docket 3 (Aug. 15, 2000) (adopting release). As summarized by the SEC:
Regulation FD (Fair Disclosure) is a new issuer disclosure rule that addresses selective
disclosure. The regulation provides that when an issuer, or person acting on its behalf, discloses
material nonpublic information to certain enumerated persons (in general, securities market
professionals and holders of the issuer's securities who may well trade on the basis of the
information), it must make public disclosure of that information. The timing of the required
public disclosure depends on whether the selective disclosure was intentional or nonintentional; for an intentional selective disclosure, the issuer must make public disclosure
simultaneously; for a non-intentional disclosure, the issuer must make public disclosure

promptly. Under the regulation, the required public disclosure may be made by filing or
furnishing a Form 8-K, or by another method or combination of methods that is reasonably
designed to effect broad, non-exclusionary distribution of the information to the public.

&

Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716, at 51,716 (Aug. 24, 2000) (to be codified
at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240, 243, and 249). For further discussion of Regulation FD, see Marc I. Steinberg
Jason B. Myers, Lurking in the Shadows: The Hidden Issues ofthe Securities andExchange Commission's

Regulation FD, 27 J. CORP. L. 173 (2002).
42 See SEC Complaint, supra note 28, paras. 14-16.
3 See STEINBERG, supra note 4, at 47-48 (restating SEC Memorandum of Law Opposing Cuban's
Motion to Dismiss, which asserts that "[i]n reliance on Cuban's acceptance of a duty of confidentiality,
the company conveyed material, nonpublic offering information to the defendant [and that accordingly
under] well-settled law and a clear Commission rule [Rule 10b5-2], a confidentiality agreement
establishes a duty under the misappropriation theory").
"
See STEINBERG, supra note 4, at 203, 213-15 (examining Mark Cuban's trial testimony).
4s In his Order granting Mr. Cuban's Motion to Dismiss (while allowing the SEC to replead), Judge
Fitzwater held:
Because [SEC] Rule 10b5-2(b)(1) attempts to predicate misappropriation theory liability on a
mere confidentiality agreement lacking a non-use component, the SEC cannot rely on it to
establish Cuban's liability under the misappropriation theory. To permit liability based on Rule
10b5-2(b)(1) would exceed the SEC's § 10(b) authority to proscribe conduct that is deceptive.
Because the SEC has failed to allege that Cuban undertook a duty to refrain from trading
...
on information about the impending PIPE offering, and because the SEC cannot rely on the

duty imposed by Rule 10b5-2(b)(1) alone, Cuban cannot be held liable under the
misappropriation theory of insider trading liability, even accepting all well-pleaded facts as
true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the SEC. The court therefore grants

Cuban's motion to dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6).
SEC v. Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d 713, 730-31 (N.D. Tex. 2009).
6 SEC v. Cuban, 620 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 2010). Reversing and remanding, the Fifth Circuit reasoned:
The allegations, taken in their entirety, provide more than a plausible basis to find that the
understanding between the CEO and Cuban was that he was not to trade, that it was more than
a simple confidentiality agreement. By contacting the sales representative to obtain the pricing
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That a confidentiality agreement or NDA in the business setting is
deemed to constitute a relationship of trust and confidence is contrary to
commercial reality. 47 Parties to such agreements ordinarily "deal" at arm's
length, seeking to act in their individual or principal's best interests.48
Because the parties do not trust one another and do not enjoy a close
relationship, they are mindful to implement written agreements to protect the
confidentiality of their proprietary information. 49 Violation of such a
confidentiality agreement or NDA gives rise to a breach of contract action
and damages that may be proven due to such breach.50 But a breach of
contract suit is far different than the recognition of a relationship of trust and
confidence. Under custom and practice, these agreements accordingly do not
resemble a relationship of trust and confidence. The determination by the
SEC and a number of courts that these agreements have that status belies
commercial reality and contravenes Supreme Court precedent.5 1

information, Cuban was able to evaluate his potential losses or gains from his decision to either
participate or refrain from participating in the PIPE offering. It is at least plausible that each of
the parties understood, if only implicitly, that Mamma.com would only provide the terms and
conditions of the offering to Cuban for the purpose of evaluating whether he would participate
in the offering, and that Cuban could not use the information for his own personal benefit. It
would require additional facts that have not been put before us for us to conclude that the
parties could not plausibly have reached this shared understanding. Under Cuban's reading, he
was allowed to trade on the information but prohibited from telling others-in effect providing
him an exclusive license to trade on the material nonpublic information. Perhaps this was the
understanding, or perhaps Cuban mislead the CEO regarding the timing of his sale in order to
obtain a confidential look at the details of the PIPE. We say only that on this factually sparse
record, it is at least equally plausible that all sides understood there was to be no trading before
the PIPE. That both Cuban and the CEO expressed the belief that Cuban could not trade
appears to reinforce the plausibility of this reading.

Id. at 557-58.
" This position is well stated by an amici curiae brief filed
in this case by five distinguished law
professors (Professors Steven Bainbridge, UCLA; Alan Bromberg, SMU; Allen Ferrell, Harvard; Todd
Henderson, Chicago; and Jonathan Macey, Yale) wherein the following is stated:
In the context of a business relationship, a confidentiality agreement alone is insufficient to
create a fiduciary or similar relationship of trust and confidence between the parties. Under
both state and federal common law, a confidentiality agreement alone creates only an
obligation to maintain the secrecy of the information, not a fiduciary or fiduciary-like duty to
act loyally to the source of the information. In the absence of any other facts or circumstances
indicating the existence of a fiduciary or similar relationship of trust and confidence, there can
be no insider trading liability based on the misappropriation theory pursuant to Section 10(b).

STEINBERG,

supra note 4, at 49 (restating the Brief of Amici Curiae).

See STEINBERG, supra note 4, at 329 (asserting that "parties customarily enter into non-disclosure
agreements because they deal at arms-length and do not trust one another").
49 See generally GERARDUS BLOKDYK, NON-DISCLOSURE AGREEMENT (3d ed. 2018).
5" See STEINBERG, supra note 4, at 329 ("Noncompliance with such an agreement may well constitute
a breach a contract; but a contractual breach is distinctly different from fiduciary transgression.").
51 See id at 49 (excerpting a brief of amici curiae in support of Mark Cuban's
Motion to Dismiss,
which states: "Assuming that [SEC] Rule 10b5-2(b)(1) is even applicable to business relationships, a
confidentiality agreement alone would be insufficient to establish the existence of a fiduciary or similar
48
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That this seeming "fiction" has been embraced to this degree reflects a
major shortcoming in our country's insider trading laws. Developed
securities markets outside of the United States have thoroughly rejected the
U.S. approach regulating insider trading premised on the existence of a
52
fiduciary duty or a relationship of trust and confidence. Rather, these
53
countries adhere to an access or parity of information approach -the
rationale that was implemented in the U.S. by such cases as the Second
5
Circuit's 1968 decision in Texas Gulf Sulphur " before the Supreme Court
55
rejected it in Chiarellav. UnitedStates.
Under the approach embraced by these developed markets, a person may
not trade on the basis of material non-public information if she has unequal
access to such information56 or otherwise knowingly possesses such material
non-public information.57 In the U.S., this broad prohibition applies only in
the context of tender offers 58 where the SEC has adopted a broad parity of
information rule: Rule 14e-3. 59 Hence, in this country, one can legally keep
his profits under Supreme Court precedent if the transaction is structured as
a merger, yet go to prison if that very same transaction is structured as a
tender offer, thereby implicating the expansive parameters of Rule 14e-3.60

relationship of trust and confidence.").
52 For example, the parity of information rationale has been adopted by the European Union. See

Council Regulation 596/2014, art. 7, 8, 10, 14, 17, 2014 O.J. (L 173) 2, 3, 4 (EU). See generallyMARKET
ABUSE REGULATION - COMMENTARY AND ANNOTATED GUIDE (Marco Ventoruzzo & Sebastian Mock
eds., 2017). Likewise, Australia implements a parity of information approach. See Australia Corporations
Act 2001 (Cth) s 1043A (Austl.). By comparison, Ontario adheres to the access test. See Province of

Ontario Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5, § 76 (Can.).
s' See Marc I. Steinberg, Texas Gulf Sulphur at Fifty - A Contemporaryand HistoricalPerspective,
71 SMU L. REV. 626 (2018); see also sources cited supra note 52.
54 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976
(1969). See Manning G. Warren III, A Birthday Toast to Texas GulfSulphur, 71 SMU L. REV. 987 (2018);
Steinberg, supra note 53. See also MARC I. STEINBERG, THE FEDERALIZATION OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 115-33 (2018) (addressing the federalization of insider trading).
one who
5s Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) (adopting the "classical" theory whereby

possesses material non-public information must abstain from trading until adequate public disclosure of
such information is made if she owes a fiduciary duty or has a relationship of trust and confidence to the
corporation or to a party on the other side of the transaction).

56 See Province of Ontario Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5, § 76 (Can.).

s' See, e.g., Council Regulation 596/2014, art. 7, 8, 10, 14, 17, 2014 O.J. (L 173) 2, 3, 4 (EU); see
also Australia Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 1043A (Austl.).
" Generally, a tender offer is a means used "to acquire control of a corporation characterized by
active solicitation to purchase a substantial percentage of the target's stock from the target's shareholders
at a premium over the market price, offered for a limited period of time and that may be contingent upon
the tender of a specific number of shares." STEINBERG, supra note 26, at 500.
59

17 C.F.R.

§ 240.14e-3

(2019) (generally prohibiting trading and tipping in the tender offer setting

of the subject securities when a person is in possession of material and non-public information).
6

See SEC v. Switzer, 590 F. Supp. 756, 766 (W.D. Okla. 1984) (holding that defendant was not

liable for illegal insider trading under Section 10(b) because the corporate executive was unaware that
respondent overheard the executive's conversation with his wife revealing a forthcoming merger
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Such an approach treats similarly situated actors in a significantly disparate
fashion and understandably may be viewed as fundamentally unfair.6 1
Mr. Cuban's trading of Mamma.com stock occurred in the context of a
company stock offering, thereby clearly not implicating Rule 14e-3. This is
not to suggest that Mr. Cuban would have incurred liability if the parity of
information approach of Rule 14e-3 were applicable. Indeed, Mr. Cuban
would have been found not liable regardless of the insider trading framework
applied as the jury found that the subject information involving the
Mamma.com PIPE offering was neither material nor non-public. 62 This
finding of fact may strike some observers as surprising. It is better understood
with the backdrop of key strategic decisions made by the SEC, a number of
which contributed to the Commission's catastrophic defeat in this litigation. 63
III. THE SEC'S STRATEGIC DECISIONS-A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT

Playing the position of Monday-morning quarterback, it may be posited
that the SEC made a number of strategic decisions that may be seriously
questioned. The first is why the Commission elected to bring this litigation
in Dallas where the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas
sits. 64 Dallas is Mr. Cuban's "home court"-a city where he is widely
respected, viewed as an astute business person, and engaged in meaningful
philanthropic causes. 65 Outside of Dallas, he may or may not be perceived as
positively, particularly given the large number of fines levied by the NBA
against Mr. Cuban for his criticism of the league's officiating and his
demonstrative rooting for his Mavericks. 66

transaction).
61 The author has expressed this criticism on previous occasions.
See, e.g., Marc I. Steinberg, Insider
Trading, Selective Disclosure, andPromptDisclosure: A ComparativeAnalysis, 22 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON.
L. 635, 646 (2001) ("[S]uch inconsistency cannot be reconciled with market integrity, investor
protection,
or basic concepts of fair treatment among similar market participants.").
62 See STEINBERG, supra note
4, at 319.
63 See discussion infra notes 64-95 and accompanying text.
" See STEINBFRG, supra note 4, at 323-26.
6 See, e.g., Mark Cuban Launches an Al Bootcamp
in Partnershipwith Microsoft and

Walmart, IBL
NEWS (New York) (July 30, 2019), https://ibinews.org/mark-cuban-launches-an-ai-booteamp-inpartnership-with-microsoft-and-walmart/ (reporting on the inaugural "Al Bootcamp" program, which

allows high school students in Dallas to learn skills in emerging technology).

66 See, e.g., Jodie Valade, Mark Cuban Does the Unexpected,
ESPNW (June 2, 2011),
http://www.espn.com/espnw/news/article/6615266/nba-finals-dallas-mavericks-owner-mark-cubandoes-unexpected (reporting that, as of that time, Mr. Cuban had been levied fines of approximately
$1,665,000 by the NBA based on 13 incidents as owner of the Dallas Mavericks); Scott
Cacciola,
Mavericks and Mark Cuban Sanctioned by N.B.A. Over Handling of Sexual Harassment, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept.
19,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/19/sports/mark-cuban-mavericks-nba.html
(highlighting criticism of Mr. Cuban and the Dallas Mavericks for their alleged lack of sufficient oversight
concerning acts of sexual harassment by certain Mavericks' employees).
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A number of other alternative jurisdictions were available. One clearly
was San Francisco, the Northern District of California. From Dallas, Mr.
Cuban placed a phone call to the Merriman placement agent situated in San
Francisco, thereby providing a sufficient nexus to file the case in that
jurisdiction. 67 The Southern District of New York-New York City-also
may have been available. Mamma.com's common stock was listed on the
68
Nasdaq, the market site of which is situated in Manhattan. In addition, to
effectuate his trades, Mr. Cuban utilized the market intermediary UBS,
69
whose U.S. headquarters are located in New York City, thereby suggesting
70
that those trades may have been routed through that office. And, as a last
possibility, there may have been a sufficient nexus with the District of New
Jersey as Nasdaq's computerized data center where trades are effected is
72
located in that state.7 1 Of course, as Mamma.com was a Canadian company,
the SEC did not have the option of filing the case in another country.
Thus, the question is presented why the Commission elected to bring this
case in Dallas, Mr. Cuban's "home" court. This inquiry becomes even more
poignant since the SEC's enforcement staff in its Washington, D.C.,
headquarters was the "team" most involved in this litigation, rather than the
73
Commission's regional office staff in Fort Worth, Texas. While a regional
office ordinarily files actions in the region in which it is situated, the "home"
office frequently brings suit in the jurisdiction that it deems most appropriate,
74
even if much of the alleged misconduct occurred elsewhere. In response,

67 See Securities Act of 1933 § 22, 15 U.S.C. § 77v (2012) (authorizing the SEC to file suit in a
federal district court where Mr. Cuban transacted business, resided, or "where the offer or sale took place,

if [Mr. Cuban] participated therein"); see also Securities Act of 1933 § 2(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(3)
(defining the term "offer to sell" in a broad manner); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 27, 15 U.S.C. §
78aa (authorizing the Commission to bring the action in a federal judicial district "wherein any act or
transaction constituting the violation occurred"). SEC Complaint, supra note 28, paras. 17-18;.
" SEC Complaint, supra note 28, para. 9; see also sources cited supra note 67.
69 See STEINBERG, supra note 4, at 324.
70 See STEINBERG, supra note 4, at 229-41 (restating the testimony of Mr. Cuban's broker, Mr.

Charles McKinney of UBS).

71 Carteret, New Jersey is the locale of Nasdaq's Data Center. See generally sources cited supra note
67. Of course, Mr. Cuban likely would have filed a motion for a change in venue to the Northern District
of Texas. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2012) (providing that "for the convenience of parties and witnesses,
in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district where it might
is
have been brought"). whether Mr. Cuban would have succeeded with respect to such a motion
transfer
uncertain. Compare SEC v. Kearns, 2009 WL 2030235 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (granting motion to

action), with SEC v. Thrasher, 1993 WL 37044 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (denying motion for change of venue).
72

Mamma.com was based in Montreal, Quebec, Canada. See SEC Complaint, supra note 28, para.

9.
See STEINBERG, supra note 4, at 323.
in
With some frequency, the Commission files its enforcement actions in the federal district court
the Southern District of New York irrespective of the fact that far more significant contacts and conduct
"

71

occurred in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., SEC v. Wyly, 788 F. Supp. 2d 92 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (denying
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SEC proponents advance that the Commission does not "game" the process
and engages in fair play. Since Mamma.com was a Canadian company and
nearly all of the conduct at issue transpired in the Northern District of Texas,
that jurisdiction was the most suitable forum to file the lawsuit. 75 SEC critics,
however, have a less gentle perspective: The Commission sought to
thoroughly embarrass Mr. Cuban in order to induce him to swiftly enter into
a meaningful settlement. Filing suit in Dallas where Mr. Cuban resides and
is an active member of the community would generate significant adverse
hubbub and thereby prompt him to expeditiously negotiate a settlement to
resolve the case. 76 If that indeed was the Commission's strategy, it was
miscalculated. The end result was that the SEC litigated this proceeding on
Mr. Cuban's home court and suffered a huge defeat. Indeed, the jury returned
its verdict in favor of Mr. Cuban after only three hours of deliberation.77
This is not to suggest that the SEC would have been victorious if it had
filed the case in a different jurisdiction. There were a number of other reasons
contributing to the Commission's stinging setback. As one striking example,
the government's key witness was Mr. Guy Faurd, the Chief Executive
Officer of Mamma.com, who spoke and participated in the phone
conversation where Mr. Cuban allegedly agreed, first, to maintain the
confidentiality of the information relating to the forthcoming PIPE offering,
and second, not to trade his stock until after that information became public. 78
The SEC's dilemma was that Mr. Faur6 resided in Canada and refused to
come to Dallas to testify live at trial.79 With Mr. Faur6 beyond the court's
subpoena power,80 the Commission's only alternative was for Mr. Faure to
testify by means of his video deposition taken during the discovery stage of
the litigation.8 ' In a case based largely on credibility, the prosecution's "star"
witness declining to physically appear at trial, and instead testifying by video,
impaired the government's case. 82 Nonetheless, the SEC must have known

motion to dismiss); SEC v. Morton, No. 10-1720, 2011 WL 1344259 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (order denying
motion to dismiss); SEC v. 800America.com, Inc., No. 02-9046, 2006 WL 3422670 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)
(denying motion to dismiss and granting SEC's motion for summary judgment).
75 See STEINBERG, supra note 4, at 325.
76 See id. at 325 (noting the position of SEC critics that "[t]he Commission wanted to inflict as much
pain and embarrassment upon Mr. Cuban as practicable when bringing suit, thereby perhaps inducing him
to settle the proceeding - and the Northern District of Texas clearly met that objective").

See id. at 333. See also Merle, supra note 3.
78 See SEC Complaint, supra note 28, paras. 12-16; STEINBERG, supra note 4, at 170-83 (restating
77

the trial testimony of Guy Faur6).

79 See STEINBERG, supra note 4, at 170.
" Generally, U:S. courts lack authority to issue enforcement orders requiring
non-U.S. residents to
testify live in court.:See 28 U.S.C. § 1783; FED. R. Civ. P. 45; STEINBERG, supra note 4, at 310-11
(restating Federal District Court's Charge to the Jury).
8I See STEINBERG, supra note 4, at 170-84 (restating
trial testimony of Guy Faurd).
82 See Erin Fuchs, Why the SEC Lost Its Big Case Against Mark Cuban, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 17,
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of this striking possibility and failed to adequately account for the detrimental
impact that Mr. Faurd's absence would cause.
In view of this eventuality, it may be posited that the Commission
overplayed the strength of its case in seeking to label Mr. Cuban a
"fraudster." Even if Mr. Cuban were willing to consent to a settlement where
he neither admitted nor denied the allegations set forth in the SEC's
Complaint, a "fraudster" depiction was unacceptable. In view of Mr. Cuban's
standing in the community and reported interests in perhaps purchasing a
84
83
major league baseball team or running for political office, a "fraud"
settlement was untenable. As an alternative, the Commission had, within its
arsenal, an alternative statute that it could have invoked in this matter,
namely, Section 17(a)(3) of the Securities Act of 1933.85 That provision
encompasses negligent "inside traders" who engage in sales of their
securities. 86 Applied to this litigation, the SEC could have sought a settlement
whereby Mr. Cuban would have agreed, without admitting or denying fault,
to disgorge the loss he allegedly avoided (approximately $750,000)87 and to
an order alleging violation of Section 17(a)(3). Although it is uncertain
whether Mr. Cuban would have agreed to such a settlement offer, its
him"
attraction was evident-he would be putting this vexing matter "behind
88
That
negligence.
alleged
on
based
violation
a
to
consenting
be
and would

https://www.businessinsider.com/how-mark-cuban-defeated-the-sec-2013-10
2013),
defense attorney Stuart Slotnick).

83

(statement

by

See Rob Neyer, Mark Cuban Won't Be Buying an MLB Team, and Likely Never Will, SB NATION

(Feb. 3, 2011), https://www.sbnation.com/mlb/2011/2/3/1972652/mark-cuban-won't-be-buying-an-mlbteam-and-likely-never-will (stating that over the "past four years, [Mr. Cuban] has entered the bidding for
the Chicago Cubs and the Texas Rangers, only to walk away frustrated each time").
Happens,"He Says, WASH.
84 Jacob Bogage, Will Mark CubanRun for President? "We'll See What
POST (Mar. 6, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/2019/03/06/will-mark-cuban-run-forpresident?-"we'll-see-what-happens"-he-says.

"

15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(3) (2012).

-

86 Section 17(a)(3) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities . . . by the use of any
means or instruments of transportationor communication in interstate commerce or by use of
the mails, directly or indirectly ... to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 697 (1980) (holding that negligent conduct is actionable under Section
17(a)(3) in SEC enforcement actions); Marc I. Steinberg, SEC and Other Permanent Injunctions
Standardsfor Their Imposition, Modifcation, and Dissolution, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 27, 34-41 (1980)
(discussing ramifications of the Supreme Court's decision in Aaron).
87 See SEC Complaint, supra note 28, para. 24 ("By selling his Mamma.com shares prior to the public
announcement of the PIPE, Cuban avoided losses in excess of $750,000.").

88 Occasionally, the SEC has invoked Section 17(a)(3) to settle cases involving alleged illegal insider
WL
trading. See, e.g., Bolan, Securities Act Release No. 9795, Exchange Act Release No. 75066, 2015

3413279 (May 28, 2015); Marc I. Steinberg & Abel Ramirez, Jr., The SEC's Neglected Weapon: A

U. PA. J.
ProposedAmendment to Section 17(a)(3) and the Application of Negligent Insider Trading, 19

BUS. L. 239, 282 (2017).
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is a far cry from being coined a "fraudster." With the uncertainties of the
litigation process and trial by jury, Mr. Cuban may have been inclined to
accept this proposal. 89
The most puzzling aspect of the trial involved Mr. Cuban's expert
witness, Dr. Erik Sirri, and the SEC's expert witness, Dr. Clemens Sialm. At
trial, Dr. Sirri, who formerly held high-level. positions at the Commission,9 0
testified that the forthcoming Mamma.com stock offering was publicly
known and that the nine percent drop in Mamma.com's stock price after the
company publicly announced the completion of the offering was not
statistically significant.9 ' In effect, Dr. Sirri's testimony signaled that the
information allegedly imparted by Mamma.com CEO Mr. Faur6 to Mr.
Cuban regarding the impending PIPE transaction was publicly known (rather
than confidential) and was not material to reasonable investors. 92 In his expert
witness report and his deposition testimony, the SEC's expert witness, Dr.
Sialm, disagreed with Dr. Sirri's position, opining that the information that
Mr. Cuban allegedly received from Mr. Faurd was both material and non-

public. 93

To the astonishment of many, however, the Commission declined to call
Dr. Sialm as a witness either in its direct case or in its rebuttal to Dr. Sirri's
testimony. One can only ponder why: (1) Did Dr. Sialm change his mind and
agree with Dr. Sirri? (2) Did the SEC believe that its cross-examination of
Dr. Sirri was so effective that there was no need for Dr. Sialm to testify? (3)
Did Dr. Sialm have previous writings and/or testimony that would have
subjected him to severe impeachment by Mr. Cuban's lawyers? (4) Was Dr.
Sialm unavailable to testify due to personal reasons unrelated to this case?
The answer to why Dr. Sialm did not testify at trial is not in the public
domain. We do know that his absence meant that Dr. Sirri's testimony was
not contradicted by any other witness. And Dr. Sirri's opinions were

89

See STEINBERG, supra note 4, at 329-31.

90 Dr. Sirri previously held the high-level positions of chief economist
and director of the division of
trading and markets at the SEC. See STEINBERG, supra note 4, at 263 (restating trial testimony of Dr.

Sirri).
91 See STEINBERG, supra note 4, at 264-73.
92

See id. at 264-73; SEC v. Mayhew, 121 F.3d 44, 50 (2d Cir. 1997) (citations omitted)

("Information becomes public when disclosed to achieve a broad dissemination to the investing public
generally and without favoring any special person or group . .. or when, although known only by a few
persons, their trading on it has caused the information tobe fully impounded into the price of the particular
stock.").
93 See STEINBERG, supra note 4, at 75-76 (describing Dr. Sialm's deposition testimony);
id. at 79
(court order denying Mr. Cuban's motion to exclude Dr. Sialm from testifying and discussing Dr. Sialm's
"study of the announcement effect that PIPE offerings had on the price of the issuer's common stock").
See also id. at 74 (discussing Dr. Sirri's event study finding that the information relating to the forthcoming
Mamma.com PIPE offering did not have significant price impact and was publicly available); id. at 8387 (court order largely denying the SEC's motion to exclude Dr. Sirri from testifying).
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extremely significant, targeting the essence of the case-namely, that Mr.
Cuban did not trade on either material or non-public information. Hence, the
failure to counter Dr. Sirri's testimony with an expert witness of its own (or
by other effective means) proved disastrous for the Commission. Unless Dr.
Sialm had a sudden realization of agreeing with Dr. Sirri (highly unlikely) or
was unavailable due to personal reasons unrelated to this litigation, the
94
Commission's strategy remains perplexing.
Due to the factors above (and other less vivid factors described in the
book), 95 the Commission suffered a significant defeat. After investigating and
litigating Mr. Cuban's alleged illegal insider trading for several years, the
96
jury took a mere three hours to return a verdict in his favor. Rather than
appealing the jury's verdict to the court of appeals, the SEC prudently folded
its tent. 9 7
IV. CONCLUDING COMMENTS

The SEC's enforcement action against Mr. Cuban may be viewed as a
98
case of government overreaching. It also may be viewed as a case that the
99
Commission was justified in pursuing but made key strategic errors. And
last, it may be posited that under the law of other developed markets in the
world, if the jury had determined that Mr. Faurd indeed had conveyed
material and non-public information to Mr. Cuban concerning the
forthcoming Mamma.com PIPE offering, Mr. Cuban's trading of his stock
prior to public revelation of this information would have been illegal.' 00 Of

9

Mayhew, 121 F.3d at 332-33.

These factors included the murky insider trading law in the United States, the SEC's failure to
solidly present its "star" witnesses, and the Commission's decision to call Mr. Cuban in presenting its case
to the jury. See id. at 323-34.
96 See STEINBERG, supra note 4, at 319.

9s

97 See id. at 333.

98 See George Anhang, Forewordto MARCI. STEINBERG, THESECURITES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
v. CUBAN - A TRIAL OF INSIDER TRADING, xv-xix (2019). As one of Mr. Cuban's attorneys, Mr. Anhang
commences the Foreword as follows:
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Mark Cuban was an improbable case. There was no
judicial precedent for the SEC's insider trading claim against Mark Cuban, no support for it in
the plain meaning of governing federal statutes, and no solid evidence in the record for the
factual allegations on which the claim depended-yet the SEC pushed on against Cuban
nonetheless. That the SEC's claim lacked legal and factual basis is not only what Cuban and
his legal team thought. It is what the presiding federal district judge apparently thought when
he initially threw out the case. And it is what the members of the jury clearly all thought, given
they deliberated and reached a complete verdict in Cuban's favor so swiftly.
Id. at xv (emphasis in original).
" See discussion supra notes 64-95 and accompanying text.
1"( See discussion supra notes 52-57 and accompanying text.
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course, not so in this country unless the information related to a tender offer 0
(which it did not) or that somehow an attenuated relationship of trust and
confidence was established through the entering into of an alleged oral
NDA.1 0 2 In this way, the SEC-Cuban litigation illustrates the deficiencies of
our insider trading law framework.'0 3
The litigation also highlights the high costs of litigating with the
government. In successfully defending his reputation, Mr. Cuban incurred
$12 million in attorneys' fees.' 04 Tellingly, absent access to plentiful liquid
assets or to an impressive insurance policy,'0 5 the viable recourse for targets
of government enforcement actions often is to settle on the most feasible
terms practicable.' 06 Fortunately for Mr. Cuban, he had the personal tenacity
and the financial resources to engage in this combat. Due to several factors
including the relatively weak facts upon which the SEC was relying on to
prove its case, superb lawyering by Mr. Cuban's attorneys, solid trial
testimony by Mr. Cuban, an outstanding expert witness in Dr. Sirri, and
questionable SEC strategy-Mr. Cuban emerged victorious. From the outset
to its culmination, the SEC's case was far from formidable. Nonetheless, the
Commission chose to vigorously pursue this enforcement action and
deservedly suffered a resounding defeat. 0 7

101

See supra notes 58, 61 and accompanying text; 17 C.F.R.

§ 240.14e-3

(2019); SEC v. Switzer, 590

F. Supp. 756 (W.D. Okla. 1984).
102 See supra notes 42-45, 47-51 and accompanying text; SEC v.
Cuban, 620 F.3d 551 (5th Cir.
2010).
See sources cited supra notes 52-53,
61.
'0
See ElBoghdady, supra note 2.
to An example of a successful defense after trial is the SEC's enforcement
proceeding against the
former general counsel of Ferris Baker Watts, Mr. Ted Urban. After a trial before an administrative law
judge and appeal by the staff to the SEC, Mr. Urban prevailed. See Urban, Exchange Act Release No.
103

66259, 2012 WL 1454482 (AU Jan. 26, 2012). The existence of an insurance policy evidently enabled
Mr. Urban to present a successful defense. See, e.g., Alexandra McLeod, To Indemnify or Not to

Indemnify? When CCO Insurance is the Answer, 6 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 325, 335-36 (2017).
106 See sources cited supra note 1.
107 See STEINBERG, supra note 4, at 333-34.

